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IMPLEMENTATION
IMPLEMENTATION AND AMENDMENT OF THE
1972 CONSTITUTION
Diana S. Dowling*
I. INTRODUCTION
Implementation of the 1972 Montana Constitution has been
going on since preparation for the first day of the 1973 Legislature
and will continue for legislatures to come. However, the greatest
proportion of implementing legislation was presented and passed
in 1973. In fact, some sixty bills drafted by legislative council staff
immediately following passage of the new constitution reflected
most of the mandatory legislation. Although the enabling act of the
new constitution provided that the convention could prepare a
schedule of proposed legislation for submission to the 1973 Legisla-
ture, it did not do so. Rather, the task fell to the legislative council
staff. These initial bills were the result of the staff's informal study
of areas in which the new constitution conflicted with prior statu-
tory law; therefore the vast majority of these initial bills were
largely "housekeeping" in nature.
One must remember that a state constitution provides for the
fundamental system of law that is the basis for government. A
state constitution defines relationships between and limitations on
the branches of government. The 1889 Constitution was written for
a former generation, a generation that distrusted legislatures and
courts and believed that the law should be fairly rigid, fixed, and
based more on history and custom than on the changing needs of
Montanans. The 1972 Constitution was written by and for a newer
generation, one more interested in social justice, but still somewhat
* LL.B., La Salle Extension University, 1965; admitted to Montana Bar, 1965; Execu-
tive Director and Code Commissioner, Montana Legislative Council, 1978-1986; Director,
Montana Lottery, 1987-1989; private practice, Helena, Montana, 1965-present.
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shackled by old customs and habits. Over the years, old doctrines
and beliefs gradually eroded until finally the convention delegates
discovered a whole new landscape which had to be charted. In this
vein, the 1972 Constitutional Convention delegates recognized that
a constitution must allow the statutory law to be fluid and change-
able to meet the ever growing needs of society. Because the 1972
Constitution is much less restrictive and inhibiting than the 1889
Constitution, the 1973 Legislature and those subsequent have been
freer to fill the perceived gaps in the law. The legislative process,
like the judicial process, is directed by philosophy (logical progres-
sion), history (evolution), custom (tradition), and sociology (justice,
mores). Thus, there are vogues and fashions in legislation just as
there are in literature, art, and dress.1
What seemed to meet the needs of Montanans in 1972 very
well might not meet the needs or expectations of 1993. But if the
Montana Constitution dictates rules "not for the passing hour, but
principles for an expanding future,"' statutory implementation will
continue in an optimistic atmosphere of openness, and constitu-
tional amendment will be unnecessary.
The 1972 Constitution reflects the majority opinion of 100 del-
egates, each of whom had differing personal philosophies. The leg-
islation considered by the ten legislatures since 1972 reflects the
differing philosophies of hundreds of legislators. In more modern
terminology we might refer to their philosophy as their internal
"programming." Since ratification of the constitution, medical re-
searchers and neurophysiologists have progressed dramatically in
understanding the mysteries of the brain's complex electro-chemi-
cal workings. It is a simple, but powerful, fact that the brain be-
lieves what it is told the most. Dr. Shad Helmstetter tells us:
We believe what we are programmed to believe. Our conditioning,
from the day we were born, has created, reinforced, and nearly
permanently cemented most of what we believe about ourselves
and what we believe about most of what goes on around us.
Whether the programming was right or wrong, true or false, the
result of it is what we believe. Programming creates beliefs. Belief
does not require something to be true. It only requires us to be-
lieve that it's true. Most of what reality is to each of us is based
on what we have come to believe-whether it's true or not! Beliefs
1. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 64-66 (1974) [hereinafter CAR-
DOZO]; see generally, Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) [hereinafter
Holmes], reprinted in OW. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920). I used these two clas-
sic documents as background for my reflections upon the legislative implementation of the
1972 Constitution.
2. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 83.
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create attitudes, the perspectives from which we view life.
Whatever attitude we have about anything will affect how we feel
about it, which in turn determines how we'll act about it. Every
action we take is first filtered through our feelings. Feelings de-
termine actions and actions create results.3
Proposed constitutional amendments and proposed legislation
reflect the "programming" of the proponents. This programming
changes from generation to generation and therefore is slow and
imperceptible to the subconscious that is being reprogrammed.
Programming changes are not brought about by one debate on the
floor of a constitutional convention or a legislative assembly. Nor
are programming changes brought about by a short bombardment
of lobbying or public opinion. Changes in basic beliefs, attitudes,
and feelings take time. It is interesting to speculate on the pro-
gramming behind some of the implementing legislation as well as
the constitutional amendments since 1972.
II. LIBERTIES
The abundance of legislation and litigation concerning the
right to know, right to privacy, "full legal redress", and veterans'
preference indicates fundamental change taking place in some ba-
sic programming. This process, with all its silent yet inevitable
power, was described years ago in an article concerning the chang-
ing law of foreign corporations."
When an adherent of a systematic faith is brought continuously
in touch with influences and exposed to desires inconsistent with
that faith, a process of unconscious cerebration may take place by
which a growing store of hostile mental inclinations may accumu-
late, strongly motivating action and decision, but seldom emerg-
ing clearly into consciousness. In the meantime the formulas of
the old faith are retained and repeated by force of habit, until one
day the realization comes that conduct and sympathies and fun-
damental desires have become so inconsistent with the logical
framework that it must be discarded. Then begins the task of
building up and rationalizing a new faith.'
For instance, civil rights legislation passed in Montana in the 1970s
was a natural result of the reprogramming occurring nationally
since the 1960s. In 1974 Montana's Commission on Human Rights
3. S. HELMSTETTER, WHAT TO SAY WHEN You TALK TO YOUR SELF, 63-71 (1986).
4. HENDERSON, Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, 33 POL. SCl. Q.
569 (Dec. 1918).
5. Id.
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was established by an Act preventing discrimination in employ-
ment, public accommodations, education, and real property trans-
actions. The laws protecting human rights have not remained
static, but rather have been amended at each session of the legisla-
ture since 1973. As the law has developed over the years, a greater
and greater majority of Montanans embrace a "new faith" con-
cerning individual liberties.
III. REVENUE AND FINANCE
The 1972 Constitution returned to the legislature the inherent
authority over taxation and finance by removing the onerous re-
strictions present in the 1889 Constitution. The issue of taxation
continues to arise. For example, property tax classifications have
been the subject of legislation each session since 1972. Further-
more, each election year initiatives circulate concerning some as-
pect of governmental finance, such as the sales tax-an issue which
probably will remain with us until the end of time.
As Holmes told us in The Common Law, "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience." The Montana tax laws
follow in this tradition because they are based on long-time Mon-
tana experience and custom. Although Montanans are known for
their independent thinking, perhaps historical research of tax laws
could change the custom, or programming, of Montana legislators.
As Cardozo said,
Nowadays we may see the office of historical research as that of
explaining, and therefore lightening, the pressure that the past
must exercise upon the present, and the present upon the future.
Today we study the day before yesterday, in order that yesterday
may not paralyze today, and today may not paralyze tomorrow.'
Historical research may also provide insight into the basic pro-
gramming of many Montanans who believe that if a tax measure is
truly for the common good, it should be voted on by all of the
people, not just the legislature.
IV. ENVIRONMENT
In 1972 delegates to the Constitutional Convention were aware
of the existing body of statutory law and the antiquated legal theo-
ries and laws that had evolved through tradition. One example of
the historical evolution of a law can be found in real property. No
legislator devised the system of feudal tenures. History built the
6. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 54.
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system and the law followed. Similarly, history pervades contract
law as evidenced by the seal, a former custom which has passed
with time.'
In contrast, environmental law has little, if any, history or cus-
tom in Montana. Legislators had heard of "primogeniture" and
"consideration" in contracts and of the "law merchant," but laws
pertaining to the "ecosystem" were not part of their programming.
In spite of this, the convention delegates drafted a document
which requires the legislature to provide for enforcement of our
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment and the
right to freedom from depletion and degradation of our natural re-
sources. Instead of creating a self-executing right in the constitu-
tion or creating a public trust or giving citizens explicit standing to
sue, the convention delegates imposed a duty on the succeeding
legislatures to provide for enforcement and remedies.
It is in the environmental area that we are seeing all of the
forces-logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the ac-
cepted standards of right conduct-independently and in combina-
tion, shaping the progress of the law. The dominating force during
any given legislative session will depend largely upon the compara-
tive importance or value of the social interests that are being pro-
moted or impaired. How do legislators know when one interest out-
weighs another? From experience, study, and reflection 8-their
programming. What legislators believe is true affects their atti-
tudes about the environment which in turn affects their feelings
which control their actions.
Even before the new constitution, the legislature in 1971 en-
acted the Environmental Policy Act and created the Environmen-
tal Quality Council. Since 1973 legislators have passed many envi-
ronmental Acts, including in part: the Water Use Act, the Major
Facility Siting Act, the Clean Air Act, the Natural Streambed and
Land Preservation Act, the Agricultural Chemical Ground Water
Protection Act, the Solid Waste Management Act, the Open Cut
Mining Act, the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclama-
tion Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Re-
sponsibility Act.
Montana environmental law has, indeed, had an historical
growth, "for it is an expression of customary morality which devel-
ops silently and unconsciously from one age to another.... But
the law is also a conscious or purposed growth ...because the
7. Holmes, supra note 1, at 472.
8. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 112-13.
[Vol. 51
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legislator must find the standards and morals in the life of the
community." 9 The legislators enact into law parts of our system of
social philosophy because the "spirit of the age, as it is revealed to
each [legislator], is too often only the spirit of the group in which
the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship
have given [legislators] a place."'
"Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will some day be-
come fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds, which have taken
form and shape from life."'"
V. THE JUDICIARY
The Judiciary Article of the 1972 Constitution reflects the di-
verse "programming" of the convention delegates concerning the
selection of judges. A minority of the delegates believed that a
judge should not be chosen by means of election and the majority
believed that election of judges was an inalienable, unchangeable,
constitutional right! Never by a process of logical deduction (phi-
losophy) could a person arrive at the "true" method of selection.
This programming was input by history, custom, experience.
The delegates who proposed the appointment of judges suc-
ceeded in providing for the filling of judicial vacancies via a nomi-
nating process. The constitution provides that "The governor shall
nominate a replacement from nominees selected in the manner
provided by law ... .""1 By relying on this provision, some dele-
gates and legislators assumed the nominating process would in-
clude a provision for the Judicial Nomination Commission to initi-
ate the process of selecting candidates for judicial office. However,
under the rules of the Commission and nearly twenty years of cus-
tom, the nominating process has become a "rank-the-applicant's
process" and only those lawyers who complete a lengthy applica-
tion are considered. A more philosophic approach to the method of
nomination might have lead to a different procedure. If one as-
sumes that members of the Nomination Commission are in the
best position to determine which lawyers would make the best
judges, it logically follows that if a nomination were to flow directly
from the collective and considered opinion of the commission
based on the lawyer's reputation among his or her peers, then it
would carry more prestige and be more acceptable to the best law-
yers. Currently, the application process differs little from any other
9. Id. at 104-05.
10. Id. at 174-75.
11. Id. at 64.
12. MONT. CONST. art VII, § 8.
1990]
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state job, except that the Commission is often accused of discrimi-
nating among applicants because of politics.
The Judicial Article and its implementing legislation were
greatly affected by the "preprogramming" of the delegates and leg-
islators, including the provision for appointments being effective
until senate confirmation. If such provision subverts election of
judges, that is exactly what many legislators believed was the best
for the common good.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there is no assurance that the rule of the majority will
be the expression of perfect reason when embodied in the Montana
Constitution or in the statutes, the eccentricities of legislators bal-
ance one another to effectuate a common good. As Justice Cardozo
stated,
Out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something
which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater
than its component elements .... What is good in it endures.
What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the
foundation on which new structures will be built.13
13. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 177-78.
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